Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1968

Lake Creek Irrigation Co., a Corporation v. Don
Clyde and Kate Clyde, His Wife; Larry F. Clyde
and Barbara Clyde, His Wife; Louis A. Kirk and
Jane Kirk, His Wife; James F. Clyde and Earlene
Clyde, His Wife; Robert Clyde and Lynette Clyde,
His Wife : Respondents' Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.J. Robert Bullock; Attorney for RespondentsLamoreaux &
Gibson; Attorneys for Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Lake Creek Irrigation v. Clyde, No. 11148 (Utah Supreme Court, 1968).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/77

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
LAKE CREEK IRRIGATION CO.,
a corporation,
Appellant,
vs.
DON CLYDE and KATE CLYDE, his
wife; LARRY F. CLYDE and BARBARA
CLYDE, his wife; LOUIS A. KIRK and
JANE KIRK, his wife; JAMES F.
CLYDE and EARLENE CLYDE, his wife;
ROBERT CLYDE and LYNETTE
CLYDE, his wife,
Respondents.

Case No.
11148

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
Appeal from the Judgment of the District Court
for Wasatch County
Hon. Joseph E. Nelson, District Judge
LAMOREAUX & GIBSON
Attorneys for A'P'Pellant
174 East 8th South
Salt Lake City, Utah
J. ROBERT BULLOCK for
Aldrich, Bullock and Nelson
Attorneys for Respondents
Fidelity Building
43 East 200 North
Provo, Utah

D
-- -·-·--~·1--·;-·--;---·------·---------:---c.~.-~. Supr.. mo c,ll.C.,

Ut.. h

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
NATURE OF CASE ________ --------------------------········ ........ .

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ..... ···--- -----------··-···--------- 3
RELIEF SOUGHT ······--··-·--·------------·--

·············----··4

STATEMENT OF FACTS

5

ST ATE~IENT OF POINTS:
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DELINEATED THE RIGHTS OF PLAINTIFF IN WITT
7
LAKE······---····-······-···················-····----··-·········---·--···

II.

AS AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF, THE TRIAL
COURT PROPERLY QUIETED TITLE TO
FISHING RIGHTS IN THE DEFENDANTS ________ 10

III.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DECLARING THAT EXHIBITS 7 AND 8 WERE
VALIDLY EXECUTED ____ ·-·-·····----------___________ ___ 11

IV.

PLAINTIFF IS BARRED BY SECTION 78-12-25,
UT AH CODE ANNOTATED, FROM ASSERTING THE INVALIDITY OF THE AGREE.l\IENT
AND QUIT CLAIM DEED DATED MARCH 31,
1959. ··········---------··--········--········-···--·-----·-·----·······-··----·- 1~

V.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN
AWARDING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS AND AGAINST PLAINTIFF FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEE UNDER RULE 41(a) (2)
OF THE UT AH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 20

CONCLUSION ···----·------------------·--··--········
·----···----·-------------··-··- ··-- 21
CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED
Babcock v. Dangerfield, 98 U. 10, 94 P. 2d 862 ______________ .........

8

Brandy v. Salt Lake City, 47 Utah 296, 153 P. 993 -·----··-------- - 19
. Fisher v. Davis, 77 U. 81, 84, 291 P. 493 .... ------·---· ........ .... 10-11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued
Pag~

Gibbs v. Sweet (1902) 20 Penn. Sup. Ct. 275 _____ ___________________

~I

Hanover Natl. Bank v. American Dry Dock, 148 N. Y. 612, \
43 N.E. 72 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 121
Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 U. 208, 218, 141 P. ·
2d 160, 166 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------Mercur Coalition Min. Co. v. Cannon, 112 U. 13, 184 P. 2d 341
Peterson v. liolmgren Land and Livestock Co., 12 U. 2d. 125,
863 P. 2nd 786 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 1J
Turner v. Hebron, (1891) 61Conn.175, 14 LRA 386, 22 A. 951
TEXTS:
13 Am. Jur. 871-872 --·---------------·---------- --------------------·---- ___

ll 1

19 Am. Jur. 2d 591 -------·----------------------- __________________________ H

19 Am. Jur. 2d 611 ------------------------------------------ ----------------- __ H
19 Am. Jur. 2d 660 ·---·-------·-··--··---------·------------------··----·------·---13
22 Am. Jur. 684 ----------------·-------·---------------------------------- _________ i
22 Am. Jur. 699

__ lu

STATUTES:
Sec. 16-6-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ------------------H
Sec. 78-12-25, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ____________________ -- --- I~
Rule 41 (a) (2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ----------··------ 2U

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

agt

12

In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
LAKE CREEK IRRIGATION CO.,
a corporation,
Appellant,
vs.

DON CLYDE and KATE CLYDE, his
13 wife; LARRY F. CLYDE and BARBARA
CLYDE, his wife; LOUIS A. KIRK and
JANE KIRK, his wife; JAMES F.
CLYDE and EARLENE CLYDE, his wife;
ROBERT CLYDE and LYNETTE
Ill CLYDE, his wife,
Respondents.
13
13

Case No.
11148

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE

IS
20

For purposes of consistency, we will use herein the
lower court designations of the parties as plaintiff and
defendant. Plaintiff is the appellant and defendants are
the respondents in this court.
From the beginning, the nature of plaintiff's case has
not been entirely clear and we do not believe it is easily
discernible upon this appeal.
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Originally, plaintiff's complaint sought to quiet title to:

"All rights to fishing in or around or in the vicinity
of Deer Valley Reservoir . . . (and) the same right i
in to and around the vicinity of Witt Lake located in !
Section 10, Township 4 South, Range 6 East, Salt Lake I
Meridian ... " (Italics supplied)
No particular land w::is described in the complaint, and
the fact that the defendants owned all of the land around
the Deer Valley Reservoir and Witt Lake was not then and
has never been in dispute.

At the conclusion of its evidence the trial court permitted plaintiff to amend its complaint by interlineation to
"conform to the evidence," and to delete from the complaint
all reference to "Deer Valley Reservoir." (Tr. 130, 150-156)
The evidence to which the complaint was amended to con·
form was not specified. The apparent effect of the amend·
ment was the addition of a description of the land under
Witt Lake, the removal from the lawsuit of any claims con·
cerning Deer Valley Reservoir, and a deletion from the
complaint of all reference to "rights to fishing." Never·
theless, plaintiff now says on page 22 of its brief that the
"entire case from the filing of the complaint to this appeal
has been whether defendants have acquired any right WI
water or any rights to fish."
Denying defendants' motion to dismiss made upon the
ground that the evidence was insufficient to justify any
relief to the plaintiff, the trial court then granted time
to defendants to further study the effect of the amendment
and to file an amended answer and couuter-claim if defend·
ants decided to do. An amended answer and counte1· I

I
I
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claim was then filed by defendants in which they sought:
(1) to quiet title to fishing rights in Witt Lake, and (2)
under the Declaratory Judgment Act, to have the court
declare to be valid an agreement dated March 31, 1959,
between the parties and a quit claim deed from plaintiff to
defendants of the same date (Plaintiff's Exhibits 7 and 8)
which had settled many matters of controversy between the
parties, including fishing rights in Witt Lake, some six
years prior to the commencement of this lawsuit.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court held generally for the defendants on
their counter-claim (R. 28-29, 32-36), and as basic propositions, ruled as follows:

l j

t

That plaintiff has those rights in the land under
Witt Lake and in the irrigation water stored thereon which
the deed and decree under which it claims provides.
( 1)

r
.I
e

I

(2) That as between plaintiff and defendants, title to
fishing rights in Witt Lake is in defendants.

That as a matter of declaratory judgment, the
agreement and quit claim deed dated March 31, 1959,
(Plaintiff's Exhibits Nos. 7 and 8) "were and are validly
executed."
(3)

~

That defendants are entitled to judgment against
plaintiff in the amount of $250.00 for attorneys fees under
Rule 41(a) (2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in connection with the amendment of plaintiff's complaint during the
course of trial.
( 4)

y
ie

it I

l·

its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the
I trial Incourt
recognized that the agreement and deed above

r· I
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referred to had been executed by the president and secretary
of plaintiff corporation without a formal resolution of the
board of directors authorizing the execution thereof, but
concluded, among other things, that the agreement and
deed were, nevertheless, binding upon the corporation by
reason of a ratification by the board of directors, and it
being now estopped to claim invalidity thereof. Among
other findings, the trial court determined that at least
three of the five members of the board of directors person·
ally participated in performance under the agreement and
had knowledge that an agreement of settlement of many
matters of controversy between the plaintiff and the defend·
ants had been reached. The court determined as both fact
and law that the directors had failed to inform themselves
as to the particulars of the settlement agreement, although
doing work thereunder, and in that respect did not use due
diligence required of them as directors necessary to shield
the corporation from liability. The court also concluded that
the plaintiff corporation had accepted the benefits under
the agreement for more than six years, and did not repudi·
ate the same until shortly before its lawsuit was commenced.
In addition, the court found, and it was freely admitted
by plaintiff's witnesses, that the corporation had paid
attorney Glen Hatch $160.00 for legal services performed
in drafting the agreement, about which it claimed that
it had no knowledge.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Defendants believe the trial court was correct in its
judgment and request the Supreme Court to so affirm.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The recitation of facts by the plaintiff are generally
correct insofar as they reflect part of the testimony of particular witnesses. However, in our view, they are incomplete
to properly present the law matters to the court, and for
the convenience of the court, the findings made below which
are generally not disputed, are set forth verbatim:
"l. That plaintiff's rights in and to the land under
Witt Lake described in plaintiff's Amended Complaint came

from John E. Moulton and Isabell Moulton by mesne conveyances; that in the warranty deed from the Moultons
dated November 14, 1911, received in evidence as defendants'
Exhibit 15, the following reservations were made:
'The said grantors hereby reserve the right to use
for grazing purposes all such part of the above-described land as shall not, from time to time, be covered
with water for reservoir purposes, it being understood,
however, that the grantee, his heirs, or assigns, shall.
at all times hereafter have the right to cover all, or any
portion, of the lands with water for reservoir purposes.
'And it is further reserved by the grantors that
the said land shall not be fenced so as to exclude the use
thereof by the said grantors for grazing purposes, and
for watering stock at the reservoir now constructed
or that may hereafter be constructed thereon.'
''2. That defendants are the owners of all of the land
surrounding Witt Lake and their title to such lands also
came originally from John E. Moulton and Isabell Moulton
by mesne conveyances.
"3. That the water covering said land to form Witt
Lake comes from Lake Creek, a public stream, and by a decree of this court entered in 1904, a copy of which was introduced in evidence as plaintiff's Exhibit 5, plaintiff was
awarded certain irrigation rights in said Lake Creek water.
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"4. That from time to time said lake has been stocked
with game fish by the Department of Fish and Game of the
State of Utah, and occasionally over several years, the unorganized public has angled for fish therein.
"5. That on or about March 31, 1959, Clyde Ritchie and
Louris V. Mahoney, who were the president and secretary,
respectively, of plaintiff corporation, and had been so for
many years, ex~.:uted and delivered to defendants a written
agreement identified as plaintiff's Exhibit No. 7, and a
quit claim deed identified as plaintiff's Exhibit No. 8.
"6. That no formal resolution of the board of directors •
of plaintiff corporation authorizing the president and secre- :
tary to execute and deliver such instruments was entered :
upon the minutes of the corporation's board of directors.
I

"7. That in the spring of 1959, after the execution
and delivery of such instrument, Clyde Ritchie, George
Holmes and Kenneth Anderson, three of the five members
of the board of directors, personally participated in per·
f ormance under the agreement and had knowledge that an
agreement of settlement of many matters of controversy
between the plaintiff and the defendants had been reached;
that said directors apparently failed to inform themselves I
as to the particulars of the settlement agreement, and did I
not use due diligence in that regard.
1

1

"8. That plaintiff corporation paid defendants' attor·
ney for preparing the settlement agreement and quit claim
deed pursuant to the agreement which he prepared.
"9. That prior to March 31, 1959, all of the directors
knew defendants asserted a claim against plaintiff corpora·
tion for the loss of certain lambs, and knew that a settlement
of said claim had been made, but apparently failed to inform
themselves as to the particulars thereof; that said directors
did not use reasonable diligence in that regard.

II

I
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"10. That plaintiff corporation accepted the benefits
of the agreement identified as plaintiff's Exhibit No. 7, for
more than six years, and did not repudiate the same until
shortly before his lawsuit was commenced.

1

"11. That defendants' attorneys addressed letters to
the plaintiff corporation pertaining to the agreement and
quit claim deed and responses to said letters were made by
the president and secretary thereof; that said corporation
maintained no office for the transaction of its business and
there is no evidence that the business of said corporation
was ever transacted by other than the president and secretary thereof.
"12. That it is reasonable and proper that defendants
be awarded the sum of $250.00 attorney's fees as a condition
to permitting plaintiff to amend its complaint during the
course of trial."

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DELINEATED
THE RIGHTS OF PLAINTIFF IN WITT LAKE.
It is not disputed that plaintiff's right to the land
under Witt Lake came from John E. Moulton and Isabell
Moulton through Alva M. Murdock, and defendants rights
to all the lands surrounding Witt Lake came directly from
the Moultons. (Exhibits 3, 13, 15) It is further not disputed that the conveyances by which plaintiff claims the
land under Witt Lake contain the reservations set forth on
page 5 of this brief.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 is a copy of the decree of the
Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Wasatch County
entered in 1904 awarding certain irrigation rights to the
plaintiff in Lake Creek water. No mention is made therein

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

of any fishing rights, and the decree appears to be the
typical water right allocation from a public stream.
By the terms of the very instruments under which
plaintiff claims, it is apparent that plaintiff's interest in
the lands described in its complaint is solely the right to
store Lake Creek water thereon for irrigation purposes..
In view of the deed reservations and inasmuch as the titles
of both parties originally came from a common grantor,
the trial court was entirely correct in holding plaintiff's
title to the land under Witt Lake to be subject to the defend· i
ants' right of grazing, rights to water stock, and right to
have the land remained unfenced; and this does not seem
to be seriously disputed by the plaintiff.
1

With respect to "fishing rights," it is defendants' position that the record is devoid of any evidence whatever
that plaintiff ever had any "fishing rights,'' and under
the elementary rule that a plaintiff seeking to quiet title to
a property right must do so on the strength of his own and
not on the weakness of his adversary's title, plaintiff would
not be entitled to any affirmative decree in this regard under
any circumstances. Babcock v. Dangerfield, 98 U. 10, 94 P.
862; Mercur Coalition Min. Co. v. Cannon, 112 U. 13, 184
P.2d 341; Home Owners' Loan Corp. 'V. Dudley, 105 U. 208,
218, 141 P.2d 160, 166.
Plaintiff introduced some evidence to the effect that
certain persons who were stockholders in plaintiff corpora·
tion had fished in Witt Lake for a number of years, which
evidence was apparently offered for the purpose of showing
a fishing right in the plaintiff corporation by adverse user
of some of the stockholders. There is nothing in the evi·
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dence, however, which indicates in any respect that fishing
which has taken place in Witt Lake has been adverse to
the defendants. On the contrary, the evidence is to the
effect that defendants have in past years cooperated with
the Fish and Game Commission in setting the opening date
for fishing therein for the general public, and that this cooperation has been maintained over the years. (Tr. 178-180)
It is clear from the evidence that whoever fished in Witt
Lake in the past has presumptively done so as a member
of the general public and by right of the general laws and
regulations relating to fish and game as promulgated by
the Fish and Game Commission, and not as any agent of
or by right of the plaintiff corporation.
Additionally, even if it could be shown that the persons
who fished in the lake over the years were doing so adversely to the defendants, still no right to angle or fish was
or could be acquired by anyone for the reason that the law
is well settled that the unorganized public cannot acquire
the right of fishing in a pond either by grant or prescription. Turner v. Hebron, (1891) 61 Conn. 175, 14 LRA 386,
22 A. 951. And, in Gibbs v. Sweet ( 1902) 20 Penn. Sup.
Ct. 275, it was held that fishing in another's pond without
objection will lead to no presumption right. 22 Am. Jur.
684.
Furthermore, the evidence is that Witt Lake is fed by
Lake Creek, which is a public stream, and that neither at
the point where the water is diverted from Lake Creek into
Witt Lake, nor the point where waters leave Witt Lake are
there any traps, screens, or other means to prevent fish
from either entering or escaping from Witt Lake. (Tr. 173,
177) In such a case, the law is that fish therein are wild
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10
animals owned by the public, and the taking thereof is subject to control and regulation of the State and not the
owner of either the water or the land. 22 Am. Jur. 699.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that plaintiff's
evidence is woefully deficient to justify any affirmative
holding in its favor as to fishing rights.
POINT II
AS AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF, THE TRIAL
COURT PROPERLY QUIETED TITLE TO FISHING
RIGHTS IN THE DEFENDANTS.

There may be some question as to whether the defendants could quiet title to fishing rights transcending the
powers of the Fish and Game Commission and the general
statutory laws regulating angling and the taking of game•
fish; and it is not defendants' pm1)ose in this lawsuit so:
to do. However, there is no question but that, as against
plaintiff, defendants' title can be quieted; and it is im·,
material that there may be transcending powers in others. ;
Fisher v. Davis, 77 U.81, 84, 291 P. 493.
I

For several years prior to 1\farch 31, 1959, defendantl I
owned all of the land around the lake and conducted lambing I
operations in the vicinity of the lake, which lambing opera· I
tions were being seriously interferred with by the public i
fishing in Witt Lake. (Tr. 170-172) While they never'
sought to prohibit it, defendants did desire to maintain some
control over the fishing public, including stockholders of
the plaintiff corporation, which control was exercised bl
defendants for a number of years prior to the commencement of this action through cooperation with the Fish and
Game Commission. (Tr. 178-180)
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The provision in the agreement of March 31, 1959,
with respect to fishing rights and the quit claim deed executed pursuant thereto, were in pursuance of an objective
by defendant owners of the land surrounding Witt Lake
to eliminate any question as to their right to control public
fishing in the reservoir, including stockholders of plaintiff
corporation. (Def. Exh. No. 11) It is our position that as
against the plaintiff corporation, the agreement and quit
claim deed (Pl. Exhibits Nos. 7 and 8) gave the defendants
full right and title to control fishing in the Lake, although
that right might not be absolute as against the Fish and
Game Commission of the State of Utah. Fisher v. Davis,
supra.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DECLARING THAT EXHIBITS 7 AND 8 WERE AND ARE VAl.r
IDLY EXECUTED.
The evidence shows that while no formal resolution
was adopted by the corporation authorizing the agreement
and quit claim deed introduced in evidence by plaintiff and
identified as plaintiff's Exhibits Nos. 7 and 8, at least four
of the five directors nevertheless personally participated in
performance of obligations under the agreement with knowledge that settlement of many matters of controversy with
the defendants had been made. They, likewise, knew of the
existence of an agreement of some sort and that they were
performing under an agreement. (See testimony of directors
in transcript as follows: Clyde Ritchie, p. 48-49, 61-66;
Harvey Crook, p. 72-74; George Holmes, p. 103-105; Kenneth L. Anderson, p. 116-118. The remaining director, William J. Bond, was an old man and ill, (p. 210). He could also
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have participated in the work according to the President
'
Clyde Ritchie, p. 64-65.)

In our view, it was, therefore, incumbent upon them .
as directors, using reasonable diligence in carrying out '
their responsibilities, to know the terms of the agreement
under which the corporation was performing. Their pro. ·
fessed ignorance of the acts of its president and secretary'
in signing an agreement does not relieve the corporation
from liability under these circumstances. The terms of the
agreement under which they were personally performing on
behalf of the corporation were readily ascertainable by any
director at any time, and their asserted collective failure
to inquire into or to inform themselves as to the particulars
thereof, although doing work thereunder with knowledge
that some kind of an agreement had been reached with the
defendants, does not shield the corporation from liability.
19 Am. Jur. 2d 591. Hanover Natl. Bank v. American
Dry Dock, 148 N.Y. 612, 43 N.E. 72.
1

That the corporation had knowledge of the agreement
and approved it is further shown by the fact that it paid
Attorney Glen Hatch $160.00 for legal services performe<l
by him in negotiating the agreement and drafing the instru·
ments to effect it. It seems to the defendants to be beyond
question that a corporation which has knowledge sufficient
to justify its payment of legal expenses for the negotia·
tion of an agreement of settlement of controversies which
the corporation has, and for drafting the necessary Jegai
instruments to effect it, and then performing under the
agreement, is certainly chargeable with knowledge of what
that agreement contains.
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The corporation reecived the benefits of the agreement, including the settlement of the claim for lost lambs,
which claim would now be barred by the statute of limitations, and which claim all of the directors knew about and
knew that some settlement thereof had been made. It is
the well established general rule that a corporation which,
with knowledge of its officers' or agents' unauthorized
act or contract and of the material facts concerning it,
receives and retains the benefits resulting therefrom, thereby ratifies the whole transaction. See 19 Am. Jur. 2d 611
and the numerous cases cited therein.
The reason for the rule is succinctly set forth in 19
Ain. Jur. 2d at page 660 as follows:
"The acquiescence of a corporation which will amount
to ratification of an unauthorized act may be evidenced
by mere silence under circumstances giving rise to a
duty to repudiate the transaction; a corporation cannot
stand by, after it has learned of an unauthorized act or
contract made or entered into by its officer or agent
and have its benefit if it would prove to be favorable
and reject it if it should prove unfavorable. As in the
case of an individual the principal, a corporation must,
within a reasonable time after receiving information of
an unauthorized transaction, repudiate the transaction and restore the proceeds of the transaction, or
the silence in such respect will constitute strong evidence of ratification or may be sufficient to engender
a presumption or constitute a prima facie case thereof."
In the case of Peterson v. Holmgren Land and Livestock
Co., 12 U.2d 125, 363 P.2d 786, his court held a contract
therein involved to be binding on the corporation even
though it was not authorized by the board of directors,
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and in its opinion quotes with approval the following Ian.
guage taken from 13 Am. Jur. at pages 871-872:
"If a corporate officer assuming to contract on behalf
of the corporation is one to whom authority to make '
such a contract may be given, a person dealing with him
in good faith is not affected by the fact that the,
proper steps to clothe him with such authority were!
not taken."
Plaintiff devotes the major portion of its brief to the
proposition that it could not validly transfer fishing right.I
to the defendants without the consent of two-thirds of ill
stockholders. An examination of the pleadings and the
record in this matter will show that this issue is raised for
the first time in plaintiff's brief on appeal. All of plaintiff's
evidence throughout the lawsuit was directed to its conten·
tion that Exhibits 7 and 8 were signed by the president and
secretary of the corporation without authority of a resolu·
tion of the board of directors. No evidence was offered as
to who the stockholders were or whether or not they ever
held a meeting concerning the transfer. The contention now
advanced that two-thirds of the stockholders must have au·
thorized the transaction is, therefore, wholly outside the
proper scope of this appeal.
More importantly, however, plaintiff's belated conten·
tion in this regard is simply not supported by the law ana
is wholly without merit for the reason that Section 16-6·9,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, is not and never has been applic·
able to the plaintiff corporation. As will hereinafter appear.
that section applies to religious, social, benevolent, scientific.
and other corporati01~s not for pecuniary profit. It has never
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been applicable to corporations for pecuniary profit such
as the plaintiff corporation.
The Articles of Incorporation of Lake Creek Irrigation
' Company (plaintiff's Exhibit 1) indicate that they were
entered into under an Act of the Legislative Assembly of the
Territory of Utah entitled "An Act Compiling and Amending the Laws Relating to Private Corporations" approved
March 13, 1884. The Articles are in the format of Articles
of a private corporation for pecuniary profit as spelled out
in the Act, including the provisions for capital stock to be
owned by stockholders. They do not in any manner follow
the statutory format of corporations not for pecuniary
1

profit.

Section 2288 s22 of the Act Compiling and Amending
the Laws Relating to Private Corporations, approved on
March 13, 1884, read as follows:

"Relig'ious, social, benevolent, scientific, and other corporations included in Section 1 of this Act when pecuniary profit is not their object, may, in accordance with
the rules and regulations or discipline of such association or institution, elect directors, the number thereof
to be not less than three nor more than thirteen, and
may incorporate themselves as provided in this Act."
Section 2291 s25 of the same Act provides:
"Corporations organized by members of associations
mentioned in Section 22 of this Act, may, when necessary for their good, mortgage or sell their real or personal property; provided, that such mortgage or sale
must be authorized by a two-thirds majority vote of
its members present at a duly called meeting for that
purpose. Such sale may be made by the directors of
such corporation and the proceeds thereof used as
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may be provided by the by-laws thereof.' (Italics
supplied)
It will be noted from the above that the two-thirds
majority vote of "members" requirement was applicable
only to religious, social, benevolent, scientific, and other corp'Orations not for pecuniary profit. There was no similar
requirement applying to profit corporations with respect
to "stockholders."

The Revised Statutes of 1898 mechanically divided the
corporation law into separate sections pertaining to corporations for pecuniary profit, and corporations not for pecuniary profit. Sections 342 through 350 dealt with corpora·
tions not for pecuniary profit, and Sections 342 and 343
set forth, with exactness, the manner in which a corporation
not for pecuniary profit is formed: These latter sections
provide verbatim as follows:
"342. Incorporation. Societies and associations where
pecuniary profit is not their object may be incorpo·
rated as hereinafter provided.
"343. Id. Articles. The associates shall meet for or·
ganization, and the chairman or secretary of the meet·
ing shall make an affidavit substantially in the follo11"
ing form:
'State of Utah
County of__ _______________ ---------1 do solemnly swear (or affirm) that at a meetini
of the members of (insert the name of the churcn
or society as known before incorporation) residini
in (insert the jurisdictional limits of the propos~
corporation) held at -----------------------·• in the countr
of ___ -----------·--------· State of Utah, upon notice to th;
incorporators by (insert a precise statement 0
the notice given, which in all cases shall be foi
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not less than 15 days, and in case of societies not
previously existing, shall be personal to each incorporator, and in case of societies already existing shall be by notice stating the time, place, and
object of said meeting, published in some newspaper having a general circulation within the proposed jurisdiction of the corporation, and by notices posted upon the door of each of the usual
places of meeting, if any, of the society) it was
decided by a majority vote of the members present
at said meeting to incorporate said society within
said limits into a corporation, with such rights
and obligations as may be prescribed by law, to be
kno\vn as _____________________________________________________________________ ;
to exist for ____________ years from the date of incorporation; for the purpose of (insert object); with
principal office at _____ ·----------------------------------------------;
with a board of trustees, (vestrymen, wardens,
directors, or such other officers as may be decided
upon, not less than three nor more than twentyfive in number), consisting of ____________ members,
of whom ____________ shall form a quorum, to be elected
(annually or otherwise as may be determined,
with time and place of election) in the following
manner: __ -------------------------------------------------------------------•
and to qualify by each giving bond to the corporation, to be filed with the secretary thereof, in the
sum of $------------------------; and (insert the name of
the officers for the first term, the method of
adopting and amending by-laws, and of receiving
and removing members, with such additional
clauses conformable to law as the incorporators
may deem necessary or desirable) .
Signature of Affiant
Subscribed and s·worn to before me this -------------day of ________________________________ , 18______ .' "
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Section 344 of the Act then provided that the affidavit
above set forth should constitute the Articles of Incorpora.
tion of such society or association and should be filed ana
recorded in the manner provided for filing and recording
articles of information for pecuniary profit.

Then follows Section 347 which prohibits corporations
not for pecuniary profit from transferring their property
without the consent of two-thirds of their "members." This
section reads as follows:
"The trustees shall have the care, custody, and control!
of the corporate property, subject to the provisions'
of the articles of incorporation and by-laws, and may,
unless otherwise provided in the articles or by-laws,
upon consent of two-thirds of the members of th1
corporation present at a meeting duly called and held,
mortgage, encumber, lease, sell, or convey any real or
personal property of the corporation, unless such property has been received as a gift or devise for some sp~
cial purpose, and if so received it shall be used ana,
applied only for such purpose. Unless otherwise pr~:
vided in the articles or by-laws, a meeting for such
purpose shall be called upon not less than 14 da)"I
notice, to be given by publication in some newspaper!
having general circulation in the place where sucn
corporation has its principal office, or if there be nu
such newspaper, then by posting on the door of tht
usual meeting place or places; such notice shall sta!il
the time, place, and object of the proposed meeting.',
(Italics supplied)
1

It is obvious from the above that plaintiff corporatiou
was not originally organized as an non-profit corporation/
and is not, therefore, subject to the requirement that tran1:
fers of property be approved by its "members."
·
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 shows that plaintiff corporation
was reorganized in 1943, and that the format of the article
filed at that time was again exactly the format of articles
for corporations for pecuinary profit, including provisions
for capital stock and "stockholders," and not "members."
If it had been intended to make the corporation one not for
pecuniary profit, the affidavit form set forth above and
which at that time was still part of the code, would certainly
have been used; and section 16-6-9 might then have been
applicable.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFF IS BARRED BY SECTION 78-12-25,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, FROM ASSERTING THE
INVALIDITY OF THE AGREEMENT AND QUIT
CLAIM DEED DATED MARCH 31, 1959.
If the incidental purpose of plaintiff's action is to

accomplish the voiding of the deed and contract executed
by the president and secretary of the corporation without.
the knowledge of the board of directors as now claimed by
the plaintiff, then such action is for affirmative relief.
Under these circumstances, the case falls within Section
78-12-25, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which requires such
action to be commenced within four years. Brandy v. Salt
Lake City, 47 Utah 296, 153 993.
As the cause of action to set aside the contract and
deed arose at the time of making thereof, which was on or
about March 31, 1959, (recorded August 13, 1959, in Book
35 at page 379 in the office of the County Recorder in and
for Wasatch County, Utah), and as the action herein was not
commenced until June 28, 1965, it is obvious that a period of
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more than four years, to-wit: more than six years had
elapsed, and any affirmative relief is barred by the above
section of the Utah Code.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN AWARD-,
ING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS AND
AGAINST PLAINTJFF FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER RULE 4l(a) (2) OF THE UTAH RULES OFCIVILi
PROCEDURE.
At the conclusions of its evidence, defendants moved \II·
dismiss plaintiff's complaint upon the ground that plain·
tiff's evidence was insufficient to justify any relief. (Tr.
154) While this motion was pending, plaintiff moved the
court for an order deleting all reference in its complaint
to Deer Valley Reservoir, and the motion was granted. (Tr.
155) The court denied defendants' request to make the I
order of dismissal with prejudice. (Tr. 155) Subsequently,
the trial court denied defendants' motion to dismiss. (Tr.
158)
Rule 41 (a) (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proced111
provides that after a responsive pleading is filed, an action
shall not be dismissed at plaintiff's instance save upon order
of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court
deems proper. Under this rule, the court can and did aware
attorney's fees to the defendants in the amount of $250.00
Plaintiff cites nothing in its brief by way of authorit)
showing that such an award was illegal or improper in am
manner.
22

11
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CONCLUSION

Based upon the evidence and the law applicable thereto, we believe the trial court was correct in its judgment
and decision, and that the same should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

J. ROBERT BULLOCK
for
Aldrich, Bullock & Nelson
Attorneys for Respondents
43 East 200 North
Provo, Utah
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